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07 Discrete logarithms in curves over finite fields
Andreas Enge
Logarithme, s. m. (Arithme´t.) nombre d’une progression
arithme´tique, lequel re´pond a` un autre nombre dans une
progression ge´ome´trique.
— Encyclopedia of Diderot and d’Alembert
The discrete logarithm problem in finite groups is one of the supposedly difficult
problems at the foundation of asymmetric or public key cryptography. The first
cryptosystems based on discrete logarithms were implemented in the multiplicative
groups of finite fields, in which the discrete logarithm problem turned out to be
easier than one would wish, just as the factorisation problem at the heart of RSA.
The focus has then shifted towards elliptic and more complex algebraic curves over
finite fields. Elliptic curves have essentially resisted all cryptanalytic efforts and
to date yield the cryptosystems relying on a number theoretic complexity assump-
tion with the shortest key lengths for a given security level, while other classes of
curves have turned out to be substantially weaker. This survey presents the history
and state of the art of algorithms for computing discrete logarithms in non-elliptic
curves over finite fields; the case of elliptic curves is touched upon, but a thorough
treatment would require an article of its own, see [10, Chapter V] and [42]. For
a previous survey on hyperelliptic curves in cryptography, including the discrete
logarithm problem, see [37].
Let us fix the notation used in the following. Given a cyclic group (G,+) of
order N , generated by some element P , the discrete logarithm of Q ∈ G to the
base P is given by the integer x = logQ = logP Q, uniquely determined modulo
N , such that Q = xP . The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in G is to compute
x given Q. A cryptosystem is said to be based on the discrete logarithm prob-
lem in G if computing discrete logarithms in G breaks the cryptosystem (in some
specified sense). Note that it is usually unknown whether breaking the system is
indeed equivalent to the discrete logarithm problem (but see the treatment of the
computational Diffie–Hellman problem in Section 1.2).
Figure 1 illustrates the complexity of the discrete logarithm problem depending
on N , as it presents itself in a number of groups suggested for cryptographic use.
In the following sections, we will examine more closely algorithms in each of the
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complexity classes, going from the slower to the faster ones, that at the same time
apply to a more and more restricted class of groups.
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Figure 1. Complexity of the DLP in different groups
1. Exponential algorithms
1.1. Generic algorithms. A certain number of algorithms allows to compute
discrete logarithms generically using only group operations in G, independently of
the concrete representation of its elements, under the only assumption that each
group element is represented canonically by a unique bit string.
Note first that the decisional version of the DLP is easy: Given Q and a can-
didate x for its discrete logarithm, it suffices to compute xP and to compare it to
Q in order to check whether x is the correct logarithm. Hence the DLP may be
solved with O(N) group operations by exhaustive search.
This complexity may be reduced to O(
√
N). Shanks’s baby-step giant-step
algorithm [64] computes first the baby steps iP for 0 6 i < ⌈√N⌉ and stores
them in a hash table; then the giant steps Q − j⌈√N⌉ for 0 6 j < ⌈√N⌉ are
computed and looked up in the hash table containing the baby steps. As soon as
a collision iP = Q − j⌈√N⌉P occurs, the discrete logarithm x = i + j⌈√N⌉ is
readily deduced. This deterministic algorithm performs O(
√
N) group operations
and requires storage space for O(
√
N) elements.
A probabilistic approach due to Pollard [59] allows to dispense with the storage
requirements. The basic idea is to compute random linear combinations Ri =
aiP + biQ. When a collision Ri = Rj occurs, the discrete logarithm is given
by x = −aj−aibj−bi mod N if bj − bi is invertible modulo N ; otherwise, at least the
partial information x mod Ngcd(N,bj−bi) is obtained. As such, the algorithm has an
expected running time of O(
√
N), but still needs to store O(
√
N) group elements.
By replacing the random choice of ai and bi by a pseudo-random walk such that
Ri+1 depends only on Ri, and by looking for collisions exclusively of the form
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Ri = R2i, one recovers Pollard’s ̺ algorithm, that heuristically takes a time of
O(
√
N) with constant storage. For a more advanced analysis, see [68].
Alternatively, one may use an approach admitting a simple parallelisation due
to van Oorschot and Wiener [57]. First of all, distinguished points are defined
as group elements with an easily recognisable property that occurs with a well-
controlled probability, such as a certain number of zeroes in their binary represen-
tation. Several pseudo-random walks are started in parallel from different points.
As soon as a distinguished point is reached, it is reported to a central machine that
stores it and performs the collision search on only the stored elements.
The existence of a canonical representative for each element is crucial for the
algorithms of complexity O(
√
N); it allows to store the elements in a hash table and
to perform a search in essentially constant time. If the collision search required a
test for equality with each of the stored elements, the complexity would raise again
to O(N).
A classical trick described in [58] consists in reducing the DLP to a series
of discrete logarithm computations in the subgroups of order p of G for primes
p dividing N . First of all, if e is the largest exponent such that pe|N , one has
x mod pe = log(N/pe)·P
(
N
peQ
)
; the Chinese remainder theorem allows to compose
these discrete logarithms in the Sylow subgroups of G to obtain x. So without
loss of generality, we may henceforth assume that N = pe is a prime power. Sim-
ilarly, x0 = x mod p is obtained as logpe−1P (p
e−1Q); then, x1 = x−x0p mod p as
logpe−1P (p
e−2(Q − x0P )) and so on, so that the decomposition in base p of x
is computed via a series of discrete logarithms in the subgroup of order p of G.
Combined with the algorithms of square root complexity presented above, discrete
logarithms may be computed with
O

∑
pe||N
e
√
p


group operations, where the sum is taken over all prime powers pe such that pe|N
and pe+1 ∤ N . So the maximal level of security reachable in a cryptosystem based
on the discrete logarithm problem depends essentially on the largest prime factor
of the group order. For prime N , this corresponds to the straight line in Figure 1.
1.2. Lower bounds. It would be interesting to know if a minimal difficulty
of the DLP may be guaranteed. Nechaev and Shoup provide a partial answer in
[56, 65]: If the only operations permitted are additions in the group and N is
prime, then Ω(
√
N) operations are needed to compute discrete logarithms with a
non-negligible probability. To bypass this lower bound, an algorithm needs to take
into account the particular representation of the group elements that distinguishes
G from the abstract cyclic group of order N .
Let us make a digression and briefly discuss the computational Diffie–Hellman
problem (CDH), that is known to be equivalent to the security of a certain number
of cryptosystems. It consists in computing abP given the group elements P , aP
and bP . In the same article [65], Shoup shows that a generic algorithm for CDH
requires Ω(
√
N) operations in a group of prime cardinality N . Even the decisional
Diffie–Hellman problem DDH (given P , aP , bQ and a candidate Q, decide whether
Q = abP ) has the same minimal complexity in this setting.
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Maurer and Wolf have shown the equivalence between CDH and DLP indepen-
dently of their difficulty in [52]. Trivially, being able to solve DLP leads to solving
CDH. For the converse direction, the authors consider the case that N is a prime
such that there is an auxiliary group H , algebraic over FN , into which FN may be
embedded in a probabilistic sense (the image of an element need not exist, but in
this case, a slightly perturbed element must have an image). For instance, H may
be an elliptic curve defined over FN , and the image of x ∈ FN is given by a point on
H with abscissa x, if it exists; otherwise, one may continue with x + e for a small
integer e. If in this situation the DLP in H can be solved by an algebraic algorithm
carrying out n group operations, the DLP in G can be solved by an algorithm mak-
ing essentially n calls to an oracle for CDH in G. If the order of H is sufficiently
smooth (that is, it does not have prime factors exceeding a polynomial in logN),
the algorithms of Section 1.1 applied to H lead to a polynomial time equivalence
between CDH and DLP in G. Notice that only the order of G plays a role in this
argument, but not the concrete representation of its elements. Using the fact that
all integers in the Hasse interval around N appear as cardinalities of elliptic curves
over FN and assuming heuristically that they have the same factorisation pattern
as random integers of the same size, Maurer and Wolf show the existence of an
auxiliary group H such that the reduction becomes polynomial. Finding the group
via complex multiplication, however, may take exponential time. If a subexponen-
tial reduction in L(1/2) is considered sufficient instead of a polynomial reduction,
it should be possible to find the group in the same subexponential time.
The generic, exponential algorithms are for the time being the only ones that
may be applied to arbitrary elliptic curves. Some particular elliptic curves admit an
embedding into another group in which discrete logarithms are considerably easier
to compute, but these curves have a very low density: They are supersingular and
other curves with a low embedding degree into the multiplicative group of a finite
field [53, 32]; subgroups of order p defined over a finite field Fq of characteristic
p, that may be embedded into the additive group (Fq,+) [61, 62, 66]; and elliptic
curves that may be embedded by Weil descent into the Jacobian of a hyperelliptic
curve of low genus following an idea suggested by Frey in [31], see [34, 18] and [42]
and the references therein. Weil descent provides another motivation for examining
more closely curves of genus larger than 1.
2. Subexponential algorithms of complexity L(1/2)
2.1. The subexponential function. Under the designation subexponential
function, one might subsume all functions that grow more slowly than exponentially,
but faster than polynomially. In the context of discrete logarithm or factorisation
algorithms, the following more restrictive definition appears naturally:
Definition 1. The subexponential function with parameters α ∈ (0, 1) and c > 0
with respect to the argument N is given by
LN(α, c) = e
c(logN)α(log logN)1−α .
To simplify the notation, we let
LN(α) = {LN (α, c) : c > 0}
and omit the subscript N when it is understood from the context.
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In the following, we will focus on the parameter α, that has the biggest influence
on the growth of the function. The parameter c is often called the constant of the
subexponential function, although it appears in fact in the exponent, so that its
influence is far from negligible.
The traditional notation LN may lead to confusion, as in terms of complexity,
one has to assume that a problem with N possible inputs is specified by logN bits,
and subexponentiality has to be understood with respect to logN rather than N :
• The extreme case α = 0, excluded by the definition, leads to the polyno-
mial logcN ;
• the other extreme case α = 1 leads to the exponential N c;
• as intermediate values, essentially α = 1/2 and α = 1/3 occur in the
contexts of discrete logarithms and of factorisation. Two typical functions
are traced in Figure 1.
The following computation rules are easily checked:
LN(α, c1) · LN (α, c2) = LN (α, c1 + c2)
logkN ∈ L(α, o(1)) for any k, and more generally,
LN(β, d) ∈ LN(α, o(1)) for β < α.
(1)
In particular, if a polynomial time operation is repeated LN(α, c) times, the result-
ing complexity is in LN(α, c + o(1)); this is why Definition 1 is often modified to
allow a o(1) term in the constant.
2.2. An algorithm for finite fields. Subexponential algorithms for discrete
logarithms usually proceed in two stages: In the first stage, called sieving or rela-
tion collection, an integral matrix is filled with relations ; the linear algebra stage
solves the resulting system modulo the group order and yields the discrete loga-
rithms of certain elements; a third, comparatively inexpensive stage may be needed
to compute individual logarithms. It has become common to call this kind of algo-
rithm“index calculus”, a rather unfortunate terminology, since “index” is tradition-
ally used as a synonym for “logarithm”. Already the encyclopedia by Diderot and
d’Alembert, published between 1751 and 1772, gives the following definition: “In-
dex, en terme d’Arithme´tique, est la meˆme chose que la caracte´ristique ou l’exposant
d’un logarithme. Voyez Logarithme.” [17].
The basic idea of creating relations and of combining them linearly for comput-
ing discrete logarithms (and for factoring) has been published by Kra¨ıtchik in the
twenties [46, Chapter 5, §§14-16]. In 1979, the algorithm has been rediscovered by
Adleman and presented with the analysis of its subexponential complexity for the
case of finite prime fields. It is easily generalised to F2m (for the reasons explained
in Section 2.5). In the following, we describe a slightly modified version.
To recall the problem, let P be a primitive element of F2m and Q ∈ F×2m ; we
wish to compute x such that Q = P x. The finite field is conveniently represented as
F2[X ]/(f) with f an irreducible polynomial of degreem, such that an element of F2m
may be considered as a binary polynomial of degree less thanm. This representation
of the field elements by polynomials introduces notions that in principle have no
meaning in a field: It is now possible to speak of irreducible elements, the degree
of the polynomials leads to a notion of size of the elements, and there is a unique
factorisation of elements into irreducibles. In fact, the factorisation is no more
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unique as soon as the restriction on the degrees is lifted, as several elements of
F2[X ] may represent the same element of the finite field.
Algorithm 2.
Input: P a primitive element of F2m = F2[X ]/(f), Q ∈ F×2m
Output: x such that Q = P x
(0) Let N = 2m − 1. Fix a smoothness bound B ∈ N and compute the factor
base F = {p0, . . . , pn} containing the irreducible polynomials over F2 of
degree at most B and P = p0. Prepare an empty matrix A with n columns
and r rows and an empty vector b with r rows for some r slightly larger
than n.
(1) repeat for i = 1, . . . , r
repeat
draw random exponents eij ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} for j = 0, . . . , n
compute
∏n
j=0 p
eij
j mod f
if the result factors over F as
∏n
j=0 p
fij
j
there is a relation
∏n
j=1 p
aij
j = P
−ai0 in F2m with aij = eij−fij
add (aij)
n
j=1 to the matrix A and −ai0 to the vector b
until success in creating a new relation
(2) Solve the linear system Ay = b modulo N , so that yj = logP pj .
(3) Create an additional relation Q
∏
p
ej
j =
∏
p
fj
j as above; return x =∑
(fj − ej)yj .
This version of the algorithm separates the linear algebra of stage 2 and the
computation of individual logarithms of stage 3, that may be repeated as many
times as desired. Alternatively, it would be enough to add the target Q to the
factor base and to stop after stage 2.
The complexity of the algorithm depends essentially on the probability that a
polynomial of degree at most m − 1 decomposes completely over the factor base,
otherwise said, that it is B-smooth. If the factor base size n is polynomial, this
probability decreases exponentially; for it to decrease polynomially, one would need
n to be exponential. The optimal value is somewhere in between; precisely, for B
chosen such that n ∈ L(1/2), the probability of obtaining a relation is in 1/L(1/2)
(see [9] and Section 2.5). Hence, the expected number of iterations for obtaining one
relation is in L(1/2), and the process has to be repeated r ∈ O(n) ⊆ L(1/2) times
to fill the matrix. As all the basic operations of the algorithm are polynomial or in
L(1/2) (for instance, the linear algebra stage is polynomial in n), the computation
rules (1) show that the total complexity of the algorithm is in L(1/2). Smoothness
is discussed in more generality and a more detailed complexity analysis is developed
in Section 2.5.
Notice that the subexponential complexity of Algorithm 2 does not contradict
the exponential lower bounds of Section 1.2: We clearly make use of the particular
representation of the elements of F×2m ≃ Z/NZ by polynomials, and the algorithm
is far from generic.
2.3. Arithmetic of Jacobians. In the light of Section 1.2, it is clear that we
need to take a closer look at the representation of elements and at the group law
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associated to an algebraic curve. To arrive at the analogue of Algorithm 2, our aim
is to show that these elements behave essentially like polynomials.
Curves over algebraically closed fields. For the time being, let us consider a
curve C defined by a non-singular irreducible polynomial C(X,Y ) over an alge-
braically closed field K. The points on C are the (x, y) ∈ K2 such that C(x, y) = 0.
Non-singularity means that for no point (x, y) on the curve, the partial derivatives
∂C
∂X (x, y) and
∂C
∂Y (x, y) vanish simultaneously. There is an integer g, called the genus
of the curve, that is closely related to the degree of C if the equation is “reasonable”,
and that measures, roughly speaking, how“complicated” the curve is. For instance,
a hyperelliptic curve in characteristic different from 2 is given by a non-singular
polynomial C = Y 2 −X2g+1 − f(X) with f of degree at most 2g; the case g = 1 is
that of an elliptic curve. A more general case is that of superelliptic curves, defined
by a non-singular polynomial Y a − Xb − f(X) with f of degree less than b and
gcd(a, b) = 1 when the characteristic of K is coprime with a. By admitting certain
mixed terms, one obtains the most general curves that have been suggested for use
in cryptography, namely Ca,b curves, given by a non-singular irreducible polynomial
of the form
Y a −Xb −
∑
(i,j):ai+bj<ab
cijX
iY j
with gcd(a, b) = 1 when the characteristic of K divides neither a, nor b. The genus
of these curves is given by g = (a−1)(b−1)2 .
To a curve, one can associate its coordinate ring K[C] = K[X,Y ]/(C), the ring
of polynomial functions from the curve to the field K. In the case of a Ca,b curve,
K[C] can be seen as the set of polynomials of arbitrary degree in X and of degree at
most a− 1 in Y , since each occurrence of Y a may be replaced by Xb+∑ cijX iY j .
The field of fractions of K[C] is denoted by K(C) and is called the function field
of C; it consists of the rational functions from the curve to K.
Except for elliptic curves, the associated group does not consist of only the
points on the curve. Instead, one has to consider the Jacobian J(C) of the curve,
an abelian variety. In practice, it is preferable to work with the isomorphic group
(denoted by Pic0(C) or again by J(C)) of divisor classes of degree 0. Define the
group of divisors of C by
Div(C) =
{∑
P∈C
mPP : mP ∈ Z, almost all zero
}
,
the set of finite formal sums of points with potentially negative coefficients. This
definition is in fact slightly wrong; instead of only considering points on the affine
curve, one needs to also take into account “points at infinity” on the projective
closure of C. Moreover, the projective closure will usually be singular at infinity;
instead of a singular point, one needs to consider several points corresponding to
its resolution on a non-singular model. Equivalently, one may define divisors as
formal sums of places of the function field K(C) instead of points. Function fields
of hyperelliptic or, more generally, Ca,b curves are particular in that they have only
one place at infinity; so it suffices to augment the set of points by one additional
special point called ∞.
The degree of a divisor is given by
deg
(∑
mPP
)
=
∑
mP .
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The degree 1 divisors containing only one point with multiplicity 1 are called prime;
indeed, they constitute indivisible atoms, and any divisor may be written uniquely
as a sum of prime divisors.
Associate to a rational function f ∈ K(C) its principal divisor, containing its
zeroes with positive and its poles with negative multiplicities. At∞ on a Ca,b curve,
the function X has a pole of order b, the function Y a pole of order a; the order at
∞ of any other function may be deduced by the triangular inequality. It turns out
that the degree of a principal divisor is 0, otherwise said, a rational function has
as many zeroes as poles, counting multiplicities. Let Div0(C) denote the group of
degree 0 divisors and Prin(C) its subgroup of principal divisors; then the Jacobian
is given by
J(C) = Div0(C)/Prin(C).
Given ∞ (or any other point on the curve, for that matter), there is a natural
isomorphism
Div0(C)→ Div′(C),
∑
P
mPP 7→
∑
P 6=∞
mPP,
where Div′(C) denotes the subgroup of Div(C) of divisors not containing ∞ in
their support. The inverse isomorphism is obtained by adding the right multiple
of ∞ to obtain a degree 0 divisor. By the Riemann–Roch theorem, each class
of J(C) can then be represented by a unique effective or positive divisor (that
is, without negative coefficients) in Div′(C) of minimal degree, which is called its
reduced (along ∞) representative. Its degree is moreover bounded by the genus g.
The coordinate ring K[C] is in fact the set of functions without poles at infinity
(or otherwise said, the integral closure of K[X ] in K(C)). But since for Ca,b curves,
∞ is the only point at infinity, this implies that the affine points on the curve are
in bijection with the prime ideals of K[C], that Div′(C) is isomorphic to the group
of fractional ideals of K[C] and that J(C) is isomorphic to the ideal class group of
K[C]. This observation allows to switch to the standard representation of ideals in
extensions of Dedekind domains: Any divisor D ∈ Div′(C) may be represented by
an ideal of K[C] in the form
(2) D = (d)(u,w)
with d, u ∈ K[X ] monic and w ∈ K[C] (cf. [22, § 163, p. 461] or [51, Th. 17] for a
proof in the number field case). The polynomial w may be taken to be monic and,
for a Ca,b curve, of degree less than a in Y . Since (d) is principal, any element of the
Jacobian is represented as (u,w). Even without recourse to the theory of Dedekind
rings, the existence of such a representative may be shown by choosing u ∈ K[X ]
having as zeroes (with the right multiplicities) the X-coordinates of the points in
the divisor D, and by letting the bivariate polynomial w interpolate (again with the
correct multiplicities, which requires some care) the Y -coordinates. Notice that a
prime divisor P = (x, y) is characterised by a representative, namely (X−x, Y −y),
in which the first polynomial is irreducible.
Relying on the representation (2) of divisors, the algorithm realising the group
law in a Jacobian works with polynomials and proceeds in two steps: The composi-
tion step corresponds to the addition of the divisors respectively the multiplication
of the ideals, while taking out principal ideals (d) of K[X ] that may appear; es-
sentially, this is Lagrangian interpolation. The reduction step computes for the
resulting divisor, that is generically of degree 2g, its unique reduced representative
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of degree at most g; this part of the algorithm depends heavily on the curve. Effi-
cient algorithms for arbitrary curves have been developed by Heß and Khuri-Makdisi
[40, 44]. For hyperelliptic curves, see, for instance, [12, 23, 48, 38]; for superel-
liptic curves, see [33, 8], for Ca,b and in particular C3,4 curves, see [4, 5, 30, 7, 1].
Curves over finite fields. In order to obtain finite groups, it is clearly necessary
that the curves under consideration be defined over a finite fieldK = Fq. Contrarily
to what one might expect, it is not sufficient to emulate the construction made
for algebraically closed fields: When adding two elements containing only points
defined over Fq, the reduction may result in a divisor containing points defined over
an extension field. To save the situation, one needs to resort to Galois invariance
and consider the Frobenius automorphism of Fq, x 7→ xq, that yields naturally the
endomorphism ϕ : (x, y) 7→ (xq, yq) on the points of the curve defined over Fq. It
is trivially extended to divisors and rational functions. The groups Div, Div0 and
Prin may thus be defined as above as sets of divisors defined over Fq, but with
the additional restriction that they be invariant under ϕ. To obtain Div′ in an
analogous manner, one furthermore needs ∞ to be defined over Fq, which is the
case for all curves under consideration. So once again, we end up with the ideal class
group of K[C]. The elements of the Jacobian are represented as above by ideals
(u,w), now with u and w having coefficients in Fq. The algorithms of composition
and reduction remain unchanged; their algebraic nature implies that they have no
“conscience” of the field over which they work.
By Weil’s theorem [70], the order of the Jacobian of a curve C of genus g defined
over Fq satisfies
(3) (
√
q − 1)2g 6 | J(C)| 6 (√q + 1)2g.
Composition and decomposition. The previous discussion shows that the arith-
metic of the Jacobian groups of the curves under consideration boils down to that
of bivariate polynomials. But as far as discrete logarithms are concerned, the group
elements even behave essentially like univariate polynomials.
As a consequence of Weil’s theorem, the majority of elements of the Jacobian is
represented by (u,w) with deg u = g, w = Y − v(X) and deg v = g − 1. When two
distinct elements D1 = (u1, Y − v1) and D2 = (u2, Y − v2) are to be added, with
overwhelming probability one has gcd(u1, u2) = 1, or otherwise said, the points in
D1 have distinct X-coordinates from those in D2. Then the result of the compo-
sition is D1 +D2 = (u, Y − v) with u = u1u2 and v the Lagrangian interpolation
polynomial such that vi = v mod ui, which is in fact independent of the curve. The
composition step for doubling a divisor (u1, Y − v1) usually results in (u, Y − v)
with u = u21 and v a Hensel lift (that depends on the curve). As long as deg u
does not exceed g, in general no reduction occurs. Otherwise, the reduction step
is also specific to the curve. So adding divisors corresponds to multiplying the u-
polynomials in Fq[X ] and updating the v-polynomials accordingly, followed by a
reduction step. In this sense, the addition in the Jacobian behaves like multiplica-
tion in Fg+1q , which also proceeds by multiplying polynomials of degree at most g,
followed by a reduction.
Over a finite field Fq, a prime divisor is a divisor that cannot be written as
a sum of two non-trivial divisors defined over the same field. Concretely, a prime
divisor of degree k is given by the orbitD under the Galois endomorphism of a point
P = (x, y) with coordinates x and y in Fqk , but not both in the same subfield. A
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typical representative occurs when x itself is not defined in a subfield of Fqk ; then
D = (u, Y − v) with u the minimal polynomial of degree k of x. (The other prime
divisors have the form (u,w) with deg u a proper divisor of k and degY w = k/ deg u
and occur in negligible numbers.) In any case, prime divisors are again characterised
by having an irreducible first polynomial.
As the decomposition of an element of Fqg+1 in Algorithm 2, the prime de-
composition of a divisor of the form D = (u, Y − v) also boils down to factoring a
polynomial in Fq[X ]; if u =
∏
ueii , then D =
∑
eiDi with Di = (ui, Y − v mod ui).
2.4. Algorithms for hyperelliptic curves. The first subexponential algo-
rithm for computing discrete logarithms in hyperelliptic curves of large genus de-
fined over a finite field K = Fq is due to Adleman, DeMarrais and Huang [3]. It
differs from Algorithm 2 essentially by the way in which the relations are created.
Let the factor base F be given by all prime divisors of degree bounded by some
smoothness bound B. Since principal divisors are zero in the Jacobian, it is suf-
ficient to draw random polynomials of the form Y − v(X) and to compute their
divisors (higher degrees in Y do not occur in hyperelliptic curves, since the poly-
nomials may be reduced modulo the curve equation of degree 2 in Y ). A smooth
divisor, that is a divisor decomposing over F, directly yields a relation. This is the
case if the norm of Y − v with respect to the function field extension K(C)/K(X),
a polynomial in X , is B-smooth. Assuming heuristically that norms behave like
random polynomials of the same degree, the authors prove a complexity of Lqg (1/2)
whenever (2g + 1)0.98 > log q. The result is heuristic for a second reason. Implic-
itly, Algorithm 2 describes an isomorphism between the group and Zn modulo the
lattice formed by the rows of the relation matrix. It is unclear whether the bounds
one needs to impose on the degree of v for a subexponential running time allow to
obtain a sufficiently dense lattice to yield the isomorphism.
The first algorithm for discrete logarithms in hyperelliptic curves with a proven
subexponential running time is given in [25]. Essentially, it is Algorithm 2, that
applies directly to curves via the discussion at the end of Section 2.3. It relies
on the fact, proved in [28], that the proportion of smooth divisors is the same as
the proportion of smooth univariate polynomials. (A similar result for the discrete
logarithm problem in the infrastructure of a real quadratic function field can already
be found in [54]; it also relies on the smoothness theorem of [28].) The constant of
the subexponential complexity depends on the growth of the genus g with respect
to the finite field size q; precisely, a running time of
Lqg
(
1/2,
5√
6
(√
1 +
3
2ϑ
+
√
3
2ϑ
)
+ o(1)
)
is proved in [25] under the assumption that g > ϑ log q.
2.5. A general framework. The similarities between finite fields, Jacobians
of curves and other groups in which subexponential algorithms in L(1/2) exist to
solve the discrete logarithm problem, have motivated us to develop a framework
that allows an abstract presentation and unified analysis independently of the group
[26]. It is explained in the following to give a more detailed complexity analysis for
Jacobians of curves, as it is not more involved than a treatment of only the curve
case.
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Let P be a set of elements called prime, and let M be the free monoid over
P. Suppose there is an equivalence relation ∼ in M, compatible with addition,
such that G = M/∼ is a group. Suppose furthermore that there is a size function
deg : P→ R>1 (extended homomorphically toM), which allows to define the factor
base F as the set of prime elements of size bounded by a smoothness bound B. If
the elements of G have canonical representatives in M (usually, the smallest ones),
the unique decomposability of elements of M into primes is inherited by G. If
some technical conditions on G concerning, for instance, the computability of the
group law, the bit size of elements or the generation of G by F, are satisfied, then
Algorithm 2 may be applied without modification to G.
These notions have been introduced by Knopfmacher in [45]; he calls M an
arithmetical semigroup and G an arithmetical formation. Concrete examples are
provided by prime fields Fp, for which M = Z, deg is the logarithm and ∼ is
equivalence modulo p; and finite fields Fpm = Fp[X ]/(f), for which M = Fp[X ],
deg is indeed the degree and ∼ is equivalence modulo f . But also class groups of
number fields, for which M is the set of integral ideals, deg is the logarithm of the
norm and ∼ is equivalence modulo prime ideals. And finally Jacobians of curves C
over a finite field Fq with a unique point at infinity, for which M = Div
′(C), deg is
the degree of a divisor and ∼ is equivalence modulo principal divisors.
It remains to prove the running time of the algorithm. For it to be in L(1/2), we
need that a factor base of size L(1/2) implies a smoothness probability of 1/L(1/2).
Corresponding results can be found, for instance, in [60] for Fp, in [9] for F2m , in
[63] for class groups of imaginary-quadratic number fields (under the generalised
Riemann hypothesis) and in [28] for hyperelliptic curves of large genus. Having a
closer look at these smoothness theorems, one realises that they are essentially all
the same: For a factor base of size LN (1/2, c), an element of size logN is smooth
with a probability of 1/LN(1/2, 1/(2c) + o(1)). This result may be proved in M
under an assumption analogous to the prime number theorem: The number of
primes of size bounded by k must be of the order of q
k
k for some q, see [50, 49].
Then the number of elements of size at most x that are smooth with respect to
a bound y is asymptotically (with some constraints on the respective growth of x
and y) given by the value of the Dickmann–de Bruijn function ̺ in u = xy ; and
de Bruijn has shown in [11, (1.8)] that 1/̺(u) ∈ e(1+o(1))u log u, which provides the
link with the subexponential function.
Due to the equivalence relation, the smoothness result forM cannot be directly
transferred to G. In a curve, for instance, there are non-reduced divisors of degree g,
that as such do not occur as representatives of Jacobian elements. Nevertheless,
the results of [63, 28] provide examples of arithmetical formations in which the
same smoothness behaviour may be observed; it is thus reasonable to accept it
heuristically also in other contexts.
Given the smoothness result, the complexity of Algorithm 2 may be easily
verified. Let n = LN (1/2, d) denote the size of the factor base, with N the group
order and d a parameter to be determined later; in the curve case, N must be
replaced by qg, which makes sense in the light of Weil’s theorem (3). If a group
element may be decomposed over the factor base in time LN(1/2, o(1)) (which is
the case for all groups under consideration), the time to create r = O(n) relations
in the first stage of the algorithm is in
LN(1/2, o(1)) · LN (1/2, 1/(2d) + o(1)) · LN(1/2, d) = LN (1/2, d+ 1/(2d) + o(1))
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by (1). The linear algebra stage treats a sparse matrix of order LN(1/2, d) with
LN(1/2, d + o(1)) entries, as each relation has on the order of logN coefficients.
The Lanczos and Wiedemann algorithms of [47, 71] run in time LN (1/2, 2d+o(1))
on these matrices. Hence, the total running time of the algorithm becomes
LN(1/2,max(d+ 1/(2d), d) + o(1)).
This quantity is minimised by d =
√
2/2, resulting in a complexity of
LN (1/2,
√
2 + o(1)).
For hyperelliptic curves, this running time holds when the field size q remains fixed
and the genus g tends to infinity. When q grows as well, the discrete nature of the
degree function starts to play a role, but a moderate growth of q may be tolerated
(see also Section 2.6); following the analysis of [25], a running time of
LN
(
1/2,
√
2 +
2
ϑ
+ o(1)
)
is obtained in [26] for the case that g > ϑ log q.
An assumption that is implicit in Algorithm 2 need not be satisfied for curves:
The group must by cyclic and of known order N . If this is not the case, one may
replace the solution of a linear system by the computation of the Hermite and
Smith normal forms of the matrix, which yields a complexity of LN (1/2) with a
worse constant as, for instance, at the end of Section 2.4; see [24].
An algorithm of proved subexponential complexity in Lqg (1/2 + ε) is given by
Couveignes in [16] for a large class of curves, not limited to hyperelliptic ones, under
the mild assumption that the curve contains an Fq-rational point and that the order
of its Jacobian is bounded by qg+O(
√
g). The approach is quite different from the
one presented here and relies on a double randomisation, of the combination of
factor base elements as well as of the choice of a function in a certain Riemann–
Roch space. An algorithm without restriction on the input curve is given by Heß
in [41], who thus proves a complexity of Lqg (1/2) for all curves of large genus.
2.6. The low genus case. At first sight, these algorithms do not seem to
work in low genus. This is nicely illustrated by the case of elliptic curves, which
are of genus 1, so that each reduced divisor contains exactly one point: Either,
the smoothness bound is set to B = 1, in which case any divisor is smooth, and
the matrix contains as many columns as there are elements in the group, that is
around q. So the algorithm must be slower than the generic ones of Section 1.1,
of complexity O(
√
q). Or the smoothness bound is set to B = 0, in which case
no divisor is smooth. The problem stems again from the discreteness of B, that is
smoothed out when the genus becomes larger.
In fact, interesting results are already obtained for rather small genus, as
first observed by Gaudry in [36]. Assume g to be fixed, while q tends to in-
finity. Choose a smoothness bound of B = 1, so that the factor base is com-
posed of divisors containing only one point. By the Weil bound, its size n satisfies
|n − (q + 1)| 6 2g√q = O(√q). The smooth reduced divisors are essentially the
multisets containing g points (cf. Section 2.3); asymptotically for q → ∞, multi-
plicities do not play a role, so that the number of smooth reduced divisors is well
approximated by
(
n
g
)
= q
g
g! + O(q
g−1/2). As by (3) the Jacobian group has a size
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of qg + O(qg−1/2), the smoothness probability for a random element is, asymptot-
ically for q → ∞, given by 1g! . So filling the matrix requires g!n = O(q) trials,
and the linear algebra step on a sparse matrix with O(n) rows and columns and g
entries per row takes O(n2g) = O(q2) arithmetic operations. While this complexity
is exponential in the group size qg, the generic algorithms of complexity qg/2 are
beaten as soon as g > 5. Notice that the two stages of the algorithm are quite
unbalanced; by reducing the factor base size, an idea attributed to Harley in [36],
one may slow down the relation collection process while speeding up the linear al-
gebra. Letting n = O(qr) with r = 1 − 1/(g + 1), the total complexity becomes
O(q2−2/(g+1)) arithmetic operations, which is better than the generic complexity
already for g = 4.
A further improvement is given by The´riault in [69]. Again, the factor base
comprises only a fraction of the prime divisors of degree 1, chosen arbitrarily, say
n = qr with some parameter r to be optimised. The other prime divisors of degree 1,
however, are not discarded any more, but form the set of large primes (that in this
context, of course, are not larger than the others, but the terminology as well as
the basic idea is inspired by the large prime variation in the factorisation context).
A relation is retained if it either consists of prime divisors in the factor base (the
case of a full relation) or if it contains exactly one large prime besides elements of
the factor base (the case of a partial relation). Before entering the linear algebra
step, k partial relations with the same large prime are combined to form k − 1 full
relations; large primes that occur only once are eliminated. The net effect is similar
to the choice of a smaller factor base: Relation collection is slowed down (but not
as much), while the linear algebra is accelerated. The´riault shows that the optimal
value for r is 1 − 2/(2g + 1) for a final running time of O(q2−4/(2g+1)) arithmetic
operations; this is slightly better than the generic algorithms already for g = 3.
Finally, Gaudry, Thome´, The´riault and Diem in [35] and Nagao in [55] have
suggested the use of two “large” primes, which complicates the process of recom-
bining partial relations, but allows to reduce the factor base size even further. The
optimal value r = 1−1/g yields a running time of O(q2−2/g) arithmetic operations.
The above algorithms are formulated for Jacobians of hyperelliptic curves, but
carry over to arbitrary curves. One conclusion to draw might be that curves of
genus 3 and above should be banned from cryptography, as they are less secure
than lower genus curves for the same group order. As a more nuanced reaction,
one may also decide to increase the group size slightly, especially for a genus close
to the cross-over point. In genus 3, for instance, one would need to increase the bit
length of the group order by 12.5 % for an equivalent level of security compared
to elliptic or genus 2 curves. This need not be penalising since machine word sizes
introduce an effect of discretisation into the implementation.
3. Subexponential algorithms of complexity L(1/3)
Following the progress for factorisation algorithms, a complexity of L(1/3) has
also been established for discrete logarithm computations in finite fields. First of
all, Coppersmith’s algorithm [15] treats F2m ; it may be seen as a special case of
Adleman’s function field sieve [2], that applies to fields Fpm with p small. The
case of Fp respectively Fpm for m small is handled by Gordon’s number field sieve
[39]. Recently, it has been shown in [43] that the applicability domains of the two
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algorithms intersect, so that a complexity of L(1/3) is obtained for arbitrary finite
fields.
3.1. The function field sieve. The function field sieve is of particular in-
terest in our case since it is related to the algorithm for curves of Section 3.2. Its
starting point is the observation that the smoothness results of Section 2.5 may be
generalised by varying the size of the elements to be tested for smoothness and the
smoothness bound. The following theorem is proved in [27] for algebraic curves
whose genus grow sufficiently fast compared to a power of log q, but it holds in
more generality.
Theorem 3. Given an arithmetical formation of order N as in Section 2.5 in which
smoothness is governed by the Dickmann–de Bruijn function, let 0 < β < α 6 1
and c, d > 0. The probability that an element of size at most logLN(α, c) is smooth
with respect to the factor base containing the LN (β, d) smallest primes is given by
1/LN
(
α− β, (α − β) c
d
+ o(1)
)
.
The special case α = c = 1 and β = 1/2 has been used in the previous section
to prove complexities in L(1/2). To reach a complexity of L(1/3), this theorem
opens only one direction: Since the factor base has to be written down, one may
not exceed β = 1/3, whence the size of the elements to be decomposed has to be
lowered to logL(2/3).
The function field sieve succeeds in this goal by representing the finite field F2m ,
say, in two different ways: First of all, as before, by F2[X ]/(f) with f irreducible
of degree m. Second, as residue class field of a place in a function field over F2,
given by a Ca,b curve C : Y
a − F (X,Y ) = 0 with b ≈ a. Suppose that the ideal (f)
is totally split in F2(C), and let f = (f(X), Y − t(X)) be an ideal of F2[C] above
(f). Then the two homomorphisms with domain F2[X,Y ], given on the one hand
by the reduction ψ : F2[X,Y ]→ F2[C] modulo the curve equation and on the other
hand by the evaluation map ϕ : F2[X,Y ]→ F2[X ], Y 7→ t(X), are compatible with
the reductions modulo f and f :
F2[X,Y ]
F2[C] = F2[X,Y ]/(Y
a − F (X,Y )) F2[X ]
F2[C]/f F2[X ]/(f)
uull
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
l
ψ
))R
RR
RR
RR
RR
RR
RR
RR
R
ϕ:Y 7→t(X)
 
≃
By drawing a random polynomial w ∈ F2[X,Y ], one thus obtains a relation in
F2m whenever both images under ψ and ϕ are smooth. Some technical complications
stem from the fact that F2[C] is in general not a principal domain, so that instead of
decomposing ψ(w), one is limited to decomposing the principal ideal it generates.
Apart from this, decomposition on the function field side amounts to factoring the
norm of ψ(w) and is thus reduced again to factoring univariate polynomials.
The degree a of the curve yields an additional degree of freedom; by choosing
carefully the parameters, the degrees of the norm of ψ(w) as well as of ϕ(w) may
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be bounded by logL2m(2/3). At first sight, the situation is unfavourable since two
smoothness conditions have to be satisfied simultaneously instead of only one. But
by (1), this influences only the constant, while the lower degree of the polynomials
to be factored acts on the more important first parameter of the subexponential
function. The worse constant, however, implies that the algorithms in L(1/3) are
not immediately faster than those in L(1/2), but only from a certain input size on.
The complexity of L(1/3) is only heuristic since it relies on the assumption that the
norm of a polynomial in F2[C] has the same smoothness probability as a random
univariate polynomial of the same degree.
3.2. An algorithm for a special class of curves. It is now a natural ques-
tion to ask whether it is possible to reach a complexity of L(1/3) also for the discrete
logarithm problem in Jacobians of curves over finite fields. Given the analogies be-
tween finite fields and Jacobians used in Section 2.5 to develop a unified theory for
algorithms of complexity in L(1/2), one might nourish some hope to similarly gen-
eralise the algorithms in L(1/3) to curves. But the second way of representing F2m
as a residue field in a function field (respectively, Fp as a residue field in a number
field) does not seem to be parallelled in Jacobians. It is apparently impossible, for
instance, to stack a second curve on top of the first one.
The solution to this problem presented in [27] turns this apparent obstacle into
an advantage: Indeed, it is suggested to work directly with the curves that appear
in the function field sieve. The algorithm is not limited to Ca,b curves. Let a0 and b0
be arbitrary positive constants. Consider a family of absolutely irreducible curves
of genus g over a finite field Fq of the form
C : Y a + F (X,Y )
with F (X,Y ) ∈ Fq[X,Y ] of degree b in X and at most a− 1 in Y , where a and b
are bounded by
(4) a < a0g
1/3
M
−1/3 and b < b0g2/3M1/3
with M = log(g log q)log q = logq(g log q). To apply the smoothness result of Theorem 3,
one furthermore has to impose that g > (log q)δ for some δ > 2.
For instance, one may choose a0 > 0 arbitrarily, fix b0 =
2
a0
and consider Ca,b
curves satisfying (4); this ensures that we are not speaking about the empty set.
Relations are created in the same way as in Adleman–DeMarrais–Huang’s al-
gorithm of Section 2.4: As principal divisors are zero in the Jacobian, it suffices to
draw random polynomials w = r(X) + s(X)Y and to verify whether their divisors
are smooth; again, this amounts to factoring the norm of w in Fq[X ].
Choosing as factor base the Lqg(1/3, d) smallest prime divisors and the degrees
of r and s as cg1/3M2/3, the following two properties hold:
• First of all, the smoothness probability of the norm is (heuristically) given
by 1/L(1/3, e/d+ o(1)) with e = (a0c+ b0)/3.
• Second, the sieving space, that is, the set from which the tuple (r, s) is
drawn, is sufficiently large. In fact, it would be possible to increase the
smoothness probability by selecting r and s of even smaller (in the extreme
case, constant) degrees; but then the number of choices for w would be so
restricted that one would not even obtain a single relation on average. As
in other subexponential algorithms, one has to ensure that the number of
random choices at one’s disposition is at least as large as the number of
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smoothness tests carried out. This is the main obstacle to decreasing the
complexity below L(1/3).
By computing the Smith normal form of the relation matrix, one obtains the order
and the structure of the Jacobian as a product of cyclic groups. With the optimal
choice of the free parameters c and d, the complexity becomes
Lqg
(
1/3,
4
3
√
a0c+ b0 + o(1)
)
,
where c is the positive solution of the quadratic equation c2 − 49a0c− 49b0 = 0.
It remains to be seen how to compute discrete logarithms. One needs (as in the
third stage of Algorithm 2) an additional relation containing the divisor Q whose
logarithm is sought. Unfortunately, the size of Q cannot be controlled, and chances
are that it is of order logL(1) rather than logL(2/3). Perturbing Q randomly
by elements of the factor base, the smoothness theorem 3 implies that in average
time L(1/3), one may obtain a relation containing Q and prime divisors Qi of size
logL(2/3). It is possible to use an approach called special q descent in the context of
factorisation, creating for each Qi a relation containing it by considering functions
w = r(X) + s(X)Y passing through Qi. But in order to have a reasonable chance
of finding a relation, one needs to arrange some freedom for the degrees of r and s;
with the additional restriction of passing through one of the Qi, one again has to
decompose a divisor of degree logL(1), and the process turns in circles.
The solution suggested in [27] consists in relaxing slightly the constraint on the
running time. Let thus ε > 0 be fixed. In time L(1/3+ε), one may create a relation
containing Q and further prime divisors Qi of degree logL(2/3− ε). For each Qi,
a special q descent allows to replace it in time L(1/3 + ε) by a linear combination
of prime divisors Qi,j of degree logL(2/3 − 2ε); these Qi,j are again treated by a
special q descent, and so forth. Whenever the degree of a Qi,j,... drops below the
barrier of L(1/3 + ε), the descent returns primes of degree logL(1/3), which are
elements of the factor base, and the process terminates.
This descent approach creates a tree in which all nodes have a degree in O(g),
whose height is bounded by 1/(3ε), and whose leaves are in the factor base. As ε is
a constant, the number of nodes in the tree is polynomial in g and thus generously
covered by any subexponential function. So the following result holds:
Theorem 4 (heuristic). Let there be given a family of curves C as above, satisfying
in particular (4) and g > (log q)δ for some δ > 2, and let ε > 0. Assuming heuris-
tically that the divisors encountered during the algorithm have the same smoothness
probability of Theorem 3 as random divisors of the same degree, discrete logarithms
in the Jacobian of C can be computed in time Lqg (1/3 + ε, o(1)).
Concerning the constant of the subexponential complexity, it suffices to note
that the existence of an algorithm in L(1/3 + ε/2, c) for some constant c allows to
reach L(1/3 + ε, o(1)) by (1).
The degrees a in X and b in Y of the curve may be balanced differently. Let-
ting a ≈ gα and b ≈ g1−α for some α between 1/3 and 1/2, the algorithm for
computing the group structure remains of complexity L(1/3) (with a different con-
stant depending on α), while the time for computing discrete logarithms becomes
L(α+ ε). When α drops below 1/3, also the group structure computation becomes
slower than L(1/3); its complexity turns out to be L(x(α)) for x(α) ∈ [1/3, 1/2]
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and, in particular, L(1/2) for hyperelliptic curves. This is apparently the first nat-
ural occurrence of an algorithm with a subexponential complexity in which the first
parameter is different from 1/3 and 1/2.
3.3. The low genus case. In the spirit of Section 2.6, Diem has considered
in [20] a particular class of low genus curves, in which discrete logarithms are
easier to compute. His ideas are independent of the algorithm of complexity L(1/3)
presented in the previous section, but it turns out that the gain with respect to
general curves is in both cases due to a curve degree that is comparatively small for
a given genus. Let again be given a family of curves with q tending to infinity, this
time represented by plane models of fixed degree d instead of a fixed genus. The
factor base is formed, as in Section 2.6, by the prime divisors of degree 1, otherwise
said, the rational points on the curve. Relations are created, as in the algorithm
of Section 3.2 and as in Adleman–DeMarrais–Huang’s algorithm, by computing
divisors of polynomials; so like these two algorithms, Diem’s approach is heuristic.
He considers furthermore only the simplest polynomials, namely lines. By Be´zout’s
theorem, they intersect the curve in d points (that may have coordinates in an
extension field); so a relation is obtained whenever a polynomial of degree d factors
into linear factors over the base field, as opposed to Section 2.6, in which the
polynomial was of degree g. Using the double prime variation, one obtains an
algorithm of heuristic complexity O(q2−2/d), measured in arithmetic operations.
Diem suggests an additional trick to lower the complexity; he restricts to lines drawn
between two points that are already in the factor base. Then a polynomial of degree
only d−2 has to split into linear factors to yield a relation, and the complexity of the
discrete logarithm algorithm drops to O(q2−2/(d−2)). This algorithm is preferable
to the one described in Section 2.6 whenever d − 2 < g. Hyperelliptic curves are
not concerned, but the impact on Ca,b curves with 3 6 a < b is dramatic. The
equations d = b and g = (a−1)(b−1)2 imply that discrete logarithms are obtained
with O(q2−2(a−1)/(2g−(a−1))) operations. In particular, in the case a = 3 and b = 4
the complexity is O(q); so the discrete logarithm problem in non-hyperelliptic Ca,b
curves of genus 3 is not harder than in hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 defined
over the same finite field, while the bit length of the group order is 50 % higher
and the arithmetic is considerably more involved. This result implies that non-
hyperelliptic curves are not suited for the implementation of discrete logarithm
based cryptosystems.
4. Implementations
The latest data points for computing discrete logarithms with a generic algo-
rithm are from 2002 and 2004 and concern elliptic curves over prime fields and fields
of characteristic 2 of 109 bits [13, 14]; the 2004 computation involved 2600 proces-
sors running over 17 months.
A subexponential algorithm for hyperelliptic curves has first been implemented
by Flassenberg and Paulus [29]. Their largest example, a curve of genus 12 over F11,
is far from reaching a cryptographic parameter size; since the cardinalities of these
high genus curves were unknown, the authors had to resort to expensive Hermite
normal form computation instead of solving a sparse linear system. Gaudry reports
on an implementation of the algorithm of Section 2.6 (without large primes) in [36];
his largest examples, curves of genus 6 over F5026243 respectively F223 , surpass the
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generic record of the previous paragraph and are very close to cryptographic group
orders.
The algorithm of Section 3.3, including the double large prime variation, has
been implemented by Diem and Thome´ for a C3,4 curve of genus 3 over F231 , see
[21]. Their computation taking only a few days with the relation collection carried
out on a single CPU, this should rather be seen as a proof of concept for the
algorithm than as a benchmark on what is achievable today. The authors estimate
that discrete logarithms on a C3,4 curve with a group order of 111 bits could be
obtained by an effort comparable to that of factoring a 664 bit RSA integer.
5. Future research
The algorithm of Section 3.2 of complexity L(1/3 + ε) for computing discrete
logarithms in certain curves opens a new direction of research. During the 10th
Workshop on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC 2006), Diem has announced an
algorithm of complexity L(1/3) inspired by these ideas, but with a quite different
point of view [19]; for the time being, it is unclear whether his class of curves is
different from the one considered in Section 3.2. It would be interesting to obtain
a complete classification of the curves that are subject to a subexponential attack
of complexity better than L(1/2).
In a recent preprint [67], Smith has found a novel attack on certain hyperelliptic
curves of genus 3. He explicitly computes an isogeny to a non-hyperelliptic curve
of genus 3, which allows to transport the discrete logarithm problem and to solve
it via the algorithm of Section 3.3. Heuristically, the attack applies to about one
out of five hyperelliptic curves of genus 3. However, by considering more general
isogenies, it appears likely that the result could be extended to other curves, which
would cast further doubt on the use of genus 3 curves in cryptography.
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